Introduction
Since the quest for finding micro foundations for price-and wage-setting behaviour began in the 1970s, macroeconomic models have been developed using either time-dependent or statedependent price and wage setting rules. Recently Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) , however, presented micro-evidence of price changes which is difficult to square with either time-or state-dependent models. One reason may be the simultaneous existence of both rules, or the use of combined rules, as indicated by survey evidence (Álvarez 2007 and Fabiani et al. 2005 ). Thus the empirical findings point to more complicated macromodels.
As a first step towards understanding the empirical findings, I present as simple model of the choice between the two pricing rules. I build on the insight of Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 413) that time-dependent rules should arise when the costs of reviewing the state are large. I
show that large review costs favour time-dependent rules and that large set-up costs favour state-dependent rules. In addition, I show that an increase in the variability of the underlying equilibrium price process favours state-dependent rules as does an increase in the efficiency loss associated with being away from equilibrium. The model is a synthesis of the seminal models of the optimal state-dependent rule by Barro (1972) and the optimal time-dependent rule by Gray (1978) . Section 2 describes the equilibrium price process and the loss functions. Section 3 derives the optimal length and loss of the time-dependent rule and section 4 derives the optimal threshold, the average length, and the loss of the state-dependent rule. Section 5 analyzes the choice between the rules. Section 6 concludes with some supporting recent survey evidence of pricing behavior. 3 2. The equilibrium price process and the loss functions Following Barro (1972) , define a discrete random walk in unit steps per draw with no drift for the equilibrium nominal price, i u , as
where i ε is a random variable that takes either the value +1 with probability 0.5 or the value -1 with probability 0.5. The forecast error variance of u between two draws is then equal to one. The forecast variance over one period of calendar time, say a day, will be the number of draws per day, say k. Since the random walk implies that the forecast variance increases linearly with the number of draws, the daily forecast variance is k. Denote the daily variance 2 σ . The forecast variance of the equilibrium price t days ahead is then equal to 2 σ t .
With no drift (inflation) in equilibrium prices, it is optimal for both the state and the timedependent rules (contract) to set the price equal to the equilibrium price and keep it fixed until the next setting. 1 The time-dependent rule price runs for a fixed length of time, while the state-dependent rule resets the price to the equilibrium price when the deviation between the actual and the equilibrium price reaches a pre-set threshold. Both rules are assumed to pay the same fixed set-up cost when the price is reset.
The expected loss function used by Gray and Barro is made up of two parts: 1) the fixed setup (menu) cost, γ, averaged per day and 2) the expected efficiency cost per day associated with being away from the equilibrium price. To these two costs, I add a fixed review cost, ρ.
The state-dependent rule pays it each day, while the time-dependent rule pays it when a new price is set.
The efficiency loss at a point in time is proportional to the squared deviation of the actual (contract) price from the equilibrium price, since the efficiency loss can be measured as the dead-weight triangle arising from the discrepancy between the actual and the equilibrium price. The expected efficiency loss is then proportional to the unconditional variance of the price deviation.
Denote the time between new prices D (length of contracts). We can write the expected loss as the sum of the average per period set-up cost, the average review cost and the unconditional variance of the price deviation multiplied by an efficiency parameter θ. 2 The expected loss for the time-dependent (TD) rule is then:
and the expected loss for the state-dependent (SD) rule is:
The optimal time-dependent rule
In Gray's model of the optimal time-dependent rule, the length between resetting the price is the decision variable. 3 The length determines the expected loss.
2 θ summarizes the underlying demand and supply elasticities, which determine the deadweight loss.
3 The following is a reformulation of the Gray (1978) 
as shown by Gray (1978, eq. 11) , here with ρ added to γ.
The optimal state-dependent rule
In Barro's model of the optimal state-dependent rule, the threshold for changing the price is the decision variable. The threshold determines the expected length between price resets and the expected loss.
Two results from the theory of random walks with "reflecting barriers" were used by Barro (1972, pp. 22-23) 
The second result is that the unconditional price variance is approximately
Plug in (6) and (7) into the loss (3):
Minimize the loss in (8) with respect to h to find the optimal threshold level h*:
as shown by Barro (1972, eq. 19) . Insert optimal h* in (6) to find expected length when the threshold is optimal:
( 1 0 ) 5 Implied by the D and σ 2 equations (not numbered) in Barro (1972, p. 22 7 This is the same strategy used by Blanchard (1979) who analyzed the choice between fully contingent one-period contracts and restricted one-period price-indexed contracts, when there is a fixed cost of writing a fully contingent contract. 8 Since we take the derivative around the optimum where 0 / ) , , (
The effect of an increase in the set-up cost, γ, is given by
The direct effect of γ on the gain is proportional to the difference in the frequency (1/D) of paying the set-up cost. If review costs are sufficiently low ( γ ρ 2 < ), state-dependent rules renegotiate less often than time-dependent rules. Hence in this case, higher set-up costs make state-dependent rules more attractive.
An increase in uncertainty, 2 σ , increases the likelihood of state-dependent rule as
( 1 4 ) The greater flexibility afforded by constant review increases the gain from a state-dependent rule.
By the same token, an increase in the efficiency cost, θ, increases the likelihood of a statedependent rule as,
Conclusion
The results confirm the conjecture of Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 413 ) that timedependent rules arise when review costs are high and that state-dependent rules arise when set-up costs are high. These straightforward results tallies with the exclusive reliance on setup costs in macromodels based on state-dependent rules, such as Lucas and Golosov (2007) and the exclusive reliance on review costs in macromodels based on time-dependent rules, such as Reis (2006) . (9) from (8):
Derivation of (13) from (5) and (9) in (11) 
